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The determinants of migrants￿ remittances are the subject of this study based on German SOEP 
data (2001-2006). In contrast to previous studies we analyze the motives for remittances not only 
for foreigners but also for the broader group of individuals with a personal migration background. 
Major findings are: First, concerns about xenophobia lead to higher remittances. Second, income 
and gender has no impact on the probability to remit. Third, the acquisition of German citizenship 
is positively related to the amount remitted. All in all, remittances seem to be part of a personal 
financial allocation scheme for risk reduction.  
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In 2006, remittances from Germany amounted to more than ten billion euro, making Germany 
one of the top ten countries worldwide in remittances. The amount of remittances reported in the 
balance of payments statistics is growing and in some countries even surpasses official 
development assistance, indicating a substantial increase in migrants￿ payments to their families 
abroad during the last decade. Given the huge sums of money in question and the equally 
significant potential economic impacts, remittances are currently considered as important driving 
force behind migration (The World Bank 2005; IMF 2005).  
From a theoretical perspective remittance are usually analyzed from the angle of international 
labor economics and the economics of migration. Seminal work was done by Lucas and Stark 
(Lucas/Stark 1985; Stark 1995), who looked at remittances in the context of the new economics 
of labor migration (NELM). In recent years, three strands of literature have emerged. The first is 
a set of theoretical models focusing on the personal motives of the remitter. These models are 
based on the factors of altruism, inheritance perspectives, and strategic motives. The second is a 
set of models that consider the decision to migrate and to remit as a part of an intra-family loan 
arrangement. This idea is supported by the fact that migration costs often exceed the financial 
resources of the migrant and in many cases can only be financed by the family (Rosenzweig 
1988). Some authors argue that the intra-family loan actually takes the place of an efficient 
domestic financial sector (Poirine 1997). In this context, migration offers the possibility for 
portfolio diversification, while the intra-family arrangement offers insurance against income 
uncertainty. More recent theoretical models combine different motives, for example, altruism and 
insurance (Foster/Rosenzweig 2001).  
Germany is one of the major immigration countries in the European Union. However, there have 
been only a few studies, concentrating mainly on the 1980s and 1990s, that address the 
determinants of remittances from Germany directly. One important finding is that remittances of 
guest workers (immigrants with foreign citizenship) depend on their remigration plans 
(Merkle/Zimmermann 1992; Oser 1995). Studies analyzing remittances in the context of savings 
support this view (Sinning 2007). A recent analysis shows that with respect to remittances 
migrants are not a homogenous group: people from former Yugoslavian countries remit 
significantly more than others (Holst/Schrooten 2006).    3
Remigration plans might be affected by the legal framework of migration and the acquisition of 
the German citizenship. In 2001, the German government introduced an Immigration Act 
(Zuwanderungsgesetz) to ease the naturalization process.
1 It was followed by a leap in the 
number of applications for citizenship among immigrants. However, the number of naturalized 
migrants remains far behind the number of people qualifying for naturalization. This finding is in 
sharp contrast to the experience of other major immigration countries such as the US and France 
(Constant/Zimmermann 2007). Interestingly, however, citizenship acquisition is also important in 
studying migration patterns: German citizenship exerts a strong influence on the probability of 
returning to one￿s country of origin, as it enables immigrants to travel freely to and from 
Germany and therefore to engage in multiple migration (Constant/Gataullina/Zimmermann 
2007). In this context, remittances could be used as part of a personal or household scheme for 
international risk allocation and insurance.    
This paper fills at least three analytical gaps. First, and in contrast to existing studies, we analyze 
the determinants of cross-border transfers focusing on the broad group with personal migration 
experience (migrants). Second, we examine our findings in light of the determinants of cross-
border transfers by foreigners. Third, we check for the concerns of migrants and foreigners 
regarding hostility towards foreigners and minorities in Germany. The analysis is based on the 
data provided by the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
 2  
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives some insights into the determinants of 
remittances from a theoretical point of view. In Chapter 3 we explain the data set, the general 
estimation approach as well as the variables employed are explained. The results of the 
econometric models are discussed in Chapter 4. The conclusions (Chapter 5) present not only 
policy recommendations but also potentially fruitful directions for further research. 
 
                                                 
1Immigrants can apply for German citizenship after eight years of residency in Germany, with numerous exceptions 
allowing the naturalization process to begin as early as three years after arrival if one is married to a German citizen. 
Additional requirements for naturalization are a demonstrated ability to guarantee one￿s own subsistence and the 
subsistence of his or her dependents without recourse to benefits, possession of adequate knowledge of the German 
language, and knowledge of the legal system, the society and the living conditions in Germany, and no criminal 
record. (Constant/Zimmermann 2007). 
2 See SOEP 2001.    4
2 Theoretical considerations 
 
Seminal work on remittances was done by Lucas and Stark (1985), who developed 
microeconomic models based on extensive field work and data collection. Nowadays, two types 
of economic models can be distinguished. First, there are models that focus on the migrant￿s 
utility function and thus on individual decisions. Second, there are models that argue on the basis 
of an intra-family contract, taking the migrant￿s household of origin as the important decision-
making unit.  
In the first group, the basic model relies on altruism. With altruism, the utility function of the 
migrant depends not only on her own consumption, but also on the utility of the relatives left 
behind (Lucas/Stark 1985; Stark 1995). Their utility again is a function of consumption, which 
depends on the income either generated at home or received in the form of remittances, as well as 
their degree of altruism. One important implication is that the transfer cannot increase with the 
recipient￿s income.
3  
A second class of models emphasizes the migrant￿s family as the important decision-making unit. 
Within this context, migration and remittances are considered to result from social interactions. 
The most important approaches take the insurance motive or investment motive into account (for 
an overview see Rapport/Docquier (2005)). The basic argument is the existence of an intra-
family contract, either to reduce uncertainty or to finance investment. Usually a family with two 
members living for two periods is assumed. For each member the income I
1 is given in period 1, 
the income in period 2 is random and amounts to  I
h with probability p and 
h
I  with probability 
(1-p). It is assumed that I
h < 
h
I . This framework allows the formulation of a function of expected 
utility E(V) which depends not only on the income and the probability to realize a certain income 
but also on the degree of risk aversion ν  with ν ’> 0,ν ’’< 0 
 
(3) E(V ) = I 
1 + p ν (I
h) + (1− p)*ν* (
h
I ) . 
 
It is assumed that migration reduces income uncertainty.  
 
                                                 
3 Other models focusing on the individual utility function of the migrant underscore the argument of payment for 
services at home (exchange) (Cox 1987) or strategic behavior (Stark 1995; Stark/Wang 2002).   5
However, migration specific transaction costs (t)  range between  
 
(4) I
1 < t < 2* I
1. 
 
Since t has to be shared by the potential migrant and the non-migrant there exists a set Pareto 
efficient contracts which have to fulfil the following condition 
 
(5) Max E(V 




Important factors are the share of migration costs covered by the migrant and λ, the relative 
bargaining power of the non-migrant. In general, these kinds of models consider the family to 
reduce uncertainty and therefore to be a substitute for a smoothly functioning insurance and 
financial sector in the remitter￿s home country. Models using the insurance motive point out that 
the risks at home and the risks in the foreign country are not correlated.
4 Models relying on the 
investment motive argue that migration costs related to the creation of human capital and 
education are covered by the family through an intra-family loan (Poirine 1997). Within such 
models, better-educated migrants transfer more than low-skilled migrants because of their more 
demanding responsibilities.
5 
In practice however, it can be assumed that remittances are not driven by a single motive. Some 
recent theoretical models therefore combine different motives, for example, altruism and 
insurance (Foster/Rosenzweig 2001). Nevertheless, these models often suffer from the fact that 
the different motives cannot be discriminated completely. Furthermore, remittances made out of 
altruistic motives might induce ￿spillover effects,￿ given that some services or investment 
opportunities are offered specifically to migrants.  
All in all, the theoretical models seem to focus on a particular kind of migrant: the short-term, 
target-oriented worker who has a strong personal identification with her family of origin and who 
expects to return rather than settle in the host country. During the last decade, however, patterns 
of migration have changed dramatically (Massey/Sana 2005). Many migrants have settled in the 
                                                 
4 Migration and remittances are considered to be a component of intra-family allocation decisions, mainly 
compensating weaknesses in the domestic social security system and financial sector. 
5 In practice, of course, the strength of personal ties between the remitter and the recipient also plays a large role 
within the altruism model, as VanWey (2004) indicates. Galor and Stark (1990) demonstrate that the positive 
probability of immigrants to return to their home countries positively affect remittances (see also Docquier/Rapoport 
2005 for a review).    6
host country, and many have still maintained strong ties to their former home countries. Members 
of this group are often considered as ￿transnationals￿ (transnational persons), living in a host 
country but maintaining social and economic ties to home (Glick Schiller 1999). Remittances 
may be one component of the economics of this kind of transnational life (Guarnizo 2003). In this 
context, personal attachments and the level of integration into the societies of both host and home 
country play a role.  
 
 
3 Remittances: Data  
 
The German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) provides data on private households and 
individuals. In our analysis we use data from the years 2001-2006 on the individual level. The 
SOEP is the most important data source for the study of individual remittances and transfer 
behavior in Germany. In this survey, participants answer a broad range of questions concerning 
their socio-economic status and demographic characteristics.
6 
The dependent variables are the ￿probability to remit￿ as well as the ￿amount of remittances￿. 
Cross-border transfers to relatives and friends living in the home country are not only made by 
foreigners. Many Germans with personal migration experience send money back to their country 
of origin as well. Fortunately, the structure of the SOEP data set enables us to analyze the 
remittance behavior of both foreigners and naturalized migrants. Therefore we distinguish 
between the broader group of migrants, i.e. people with personal migration experience, and the 
smaller group of foreigners. Based on the relevant theoretical arguments and findings from the 
literature, the following independent variables are used: 
Income 
￿ To capture the influence of the migrant￿s income, we construct the net household equivalent 
income which makes it easier to compare persons in households with different numbers of 
members. According to the theoretical literature, remittances increase with the migrant￿s per 
                                                 
6 Since we focus on the determinants of the amount of remittances, which are defined as personal cross-border 
transfers by migrants, a retrospective question in the SOEP questionnaire is crucial: ￿Have you personally given 
payments or support during the last year to relatives or other persons outside of your household? How much in the 
year as a whole? Where does the recipient live? Germany ￿ Abroad￿ For details see:  SOEP questionnaires.    7
capita income￿ a finding reported in all microeconomic models. Therefore, we expect this 
variable to show a positive sign.
7   
Age and duration of stay 
￿ According to the theoretical literature, the age of the remitter plays an positive role. However, 
beyond a certain age this tends to decline. This finding is reported in many empirical studies
8 and 
often explained by the assumption that personal ties in the recipient countries become more 
distant with age. The variable ￿age squared￿ is used to control for these non-linearities. In 
accordance with the existing literature we expect a positive sign of the variable age and a 
negative one in the case of the variable age squared.  
￿ The variable ￿age divided by years￿ reflects the influence of the years spent in Germany on 
remittances. The variable takes the value of 1 if the migrant has spent his or her whole lifetime in 
Germany. The value of the variable increases with the difference between age and years spent in 
Germany. This variable can be taken as a proxy for the influence of the duration of the stay in 
Germany (relative to the age of the migrant). According to the construction of the variable we 
expect a positive sign which is in line with the findings from several previous empirical studies 
showing that remittances decrease with the length of the stay abroad.   
Education 
￿ The value of the migrant￿s human capital is reflected in years of education. According to 
theoretical models relying on altruism as well as on intra-family-investment schemes, better 
education leads to higher transfers. Therefore a positive sign is expected here. 
Gender 
￿ Many empirical studies report a significant influence of gender on the amount of remittances. 
While Lucas and Stark (1985) found in their seminal work on remittances that women show a 
higher propensity  to remit, more recent studies have produced the opposite finding (Oser 1995). 
Here we use a dummy variable to check for the gender effect here. The variable ￿gender￿ is 1 in 
the case of a female remitter and 0 in the case of a male remitter. 
                                                 
7 The net household equivalent income is constructed to tackle the scale effects in a household with more than one 
person. Consider a net income of 1,000 Euro and a household consisting of four persons: two adults and two 
children. Here, the net household equivalent income is calculated by taking the factor 1 for the first adult, the factor 
0.5 for the second and the factor 0.3 for each child. In sum we get 2.1. Now the net household income is divided by 
this sum, so we get a net household equivalent income of 476.19 Euros, which is a per capita value. 
8 See for example Merkle/Zimmermann (1992).    8
Marital status 
￿ Several empirical studies come to the result that married migrants send larger amounts of 
remittances abroad (Merkle/Zimmermann 1992; Sinning 2007). Therefore we expect a positive 
sign of this dummy variable.   
Integration, fears and remigration plans 
￿ One important determinant of the amount of remittances is the household size of the migrant in 
the host country. The more members of the household live in Germany, the more Germany can 
be considered the locus of family life. Therefore, and in line with the theoretical models and 
empirical findings, we assume that the amount of remittances decrease with increasing numbers 
of members in the migrant￿s household in Germany. In addition the acquisition of German 
citizenship can be interpreted as an indicator for integration into German society ￿ leading in turn 
to lower remittances.   
￿ Personal contacts to the home country form one important basis for remittances. Here we 
assume that visits to the country of origin are an important indicator for such personal 
attachments. Therefore, we expect such visits to exercise a positive impact on the amount of 
remittances.  
￿ Concerns about xenophobia might make Germany less attractive to migrants. Here we check 
whether these concerns influence the decision to remit. We expect that migrants with fears of  
xenophobia remit more and therefore assume that the variable shows a positive sign.      
￿ In addition, the migrant￿s plan for return migration may influence the decision on remittances. 
Therefore we expect a positive sign in the case of future return migration plans. 
Nationality 
￿ Many studies show that nationality, country of origin and the specific migration background 
might influence the remittances and transfer behavior. A migrants previous citizenship and the 
country of origin of a migrant captures numerous of non-observable determinants of remittances. 
First, the institutional and legal differences governing a stay in Germany differ depending on the 
migrant￿s country of origin. Within the group of foreigners, we differentiate between Turkish, 
former Yugoslavian and other foreigners using dummy variables. This distinction appears 
interesting because of the large size of these groups and the fact that former Yugoslavians might 
have left their country and family under special circumstances due to the Balkan war. Today they 
are under relatively heavy pressure to return home. These factors might manifest themselves in 
higher remittances. However, the country of origin not only defines the specific institutional   9
setting of migration; it may also provide insights into income differences between the remitter 
and the recipient that are not captured directly by the data set, since it enables us to look at 
average income differences between that country and Germany. These differences are relatively 
high in the case of Russia, where many of the so-called ￿Aussiedler￿ and ￿Spaetaussiedler￿ 
(Ethnic Germans) lived before migration. Considerable income differences exist alsoe in the case 
of Turkey and Ex-Yugoslavian countries. Nevertheless, since nationality/origin delivers only a 
proxy for existing income differences between the remitter and the recipient. Therefore the 
results of the estimation have to be interpreted with care. 
 
After excluding all observations with missing values on one of the variables used in the analysis, 
the panel data set contains  4 151 observations for the years 2001-2006 in the case of migrants 
and 2 879 observations for foreigners. Because not all immigrants remit, the data set contains 
many zeros. To deal with this issue, in analyzing the determinants of the amount of remittances 
we perform estimations of Tobit models, which enable us to analyze the determinants of the 
positive amount in relation to socio-economic variables. For all panel models, Hausman statistics 
are calculated to determine whether to choose random effects method over fixed effects models. 
Although random effects models do not control for omitted characteristics of the individuals, our 
objectives were to include stable covariates such as country of origin or gender of the individual 
and to increase the efficiency. The models take both within and between individuals variation 
into account and therefore display less sampling variability than fixed effects models. In 
analyzing the determinants of the probability to remit we use probit models. 
 
 
4 Empirical Results 
 
The fact, that one person remits can be interpreted as an indicator for the existence of personal 
ties to the home country. As the descriptive statistic shows about one fifth of the migrants 
currently living in Germany send money home. What determines the probability to remit? What 
affects the amount of remittances? Here, we analyze the remittance behavior of the broad group 
of migrants (people with personal migration experience, including those with German 
citizenship) and compare these findings with those on the smaller group of foreigners. The first   10
two columns of the table show the estimated impact of the independent variables on the 
probability to remit. Columns 3 and 4 show the results for the amount of remittances.  
 
4.1 The probability to remit  
 
One of the most important findings is that the probability to remit is neither governed by the net 
household equivalent income nor by gender. Married and employed migrants face a higher 
probability to remit. Household size in Germany affects the probability to remit negatively. While 
people from former Yugoslavia countries show a higher propensity to remit the reverse is true for 
Italians. The variable age divided by years, which is used as an indicator for the relative length of 
stay in Germany, shows that a shorter stay in Germany results in a higher probability to remit. 
Over time remittances are decreasing. In addition, personal remigration plans and visits to the 
country of origin lead to a higher probability to transfer money abroad. All these findings are true 
for the two groups, migrants and foreigners. 
Focusing now on the group of migrants, it becomes clear that age as well as education matter. 
These variables have a positive impact on the probability to remit. In addition, ￿(Spaet-) 
Aussiedler￿ most of who are migrants from former Soviet states show a higher probability of 
making transfers to their countries of origin, many of which are low-income economies.  
 
4.2 What determines the amount of remittances?  
 
According to our results, the amount of remittances is significantly correlated with the majority 
of explanatory variables. Many of our empirical findings support the view that remittances can be 
at least partly considered as insurance and international risk diversification.  
The most important difference between our and previous studies is that the amount of remittances 
is linked to concerns about xenophobia. We find this for foreigners and migrants. Second, we can 
show that migrants who have acquired the German citizenship remit more. This might be due to 
the fact, that the acquisition of the German citizenship enables them to multiple entries and 
therefore to multiple migration periods. This view is supported by the finding that (short) stays in 
younger years lead to higher remittances, i.e. the variable age divided by years shows a positive 
sign. Taking a closer look at the general impact of citizenship it becomes clear that migrants from 
former Yugoslavia remit significantly more than others. It can be assumed that changes in the   11
legal setting of immigration play a crucial role and might be explained at least in part by the 
relatively high pressure to return to home for former. This interpretation is supported by the fact 
that Italians are relatively reluctant concerning the amount remittances ￿ Italians as EU citizens 
are facing no pressure for return migration all at. 
In accordance with the theoretical arguments presented above we show that there exists a positive 
relationship between the age of the remitter and the amount transferred. Also in line with the 
literature, we find that this relationship is not linear. According to our results females remit less 
than males. Marriage and years of education have a positive impact on the amount of remittances.  
Personal links to the country of origin matter: Remigration plans and visits to the country of 
origin lead to higher remittances.   
Now we turn to the remittance behavior of the smaller group of foreigners. In doing so, several of 
the explanatory variables turn out to be insignificant but show the expected sign. In particular, it 
must be noted that we could not reveal statistically significant effects on the amount of 
remittances transferred by foreigners for income and personal remigration plans. In contrast to 
many existing studies on the determinants of remittances we find a linear relationship between 





The results presented do at least partly support the theoretical arguments on the insurance and 
international risk diversification function of remittances. The study shows that one important 
factor affecting remittances might be the degree of integration into the society of the hosting 
country and the concerns about xenophobia. To create sustainable migration patterns, the 
linkages between migration and social integration will become more and more important in the 
future. A successful migration policy should give foreigners a clear perspective concerning 
family reunification, naturalization and the legal status of the next generation. Such a framework 
would also enable the migrant to make efficient allocation decisions also on remittances.  
This study can be considered a first step toward the analysis of remittances in the new 
institutional framework of migration implemented in Germany during the last decade. The link 
between remittances, acquisition of the German citizenship and xenophobia points to one 
potentially interesting direction for future research. In addition, deeper investigation of the   12
potential motivations of migrants might be possible using the tools of experimental economics 
(Fehr/Fischbacher/Rosenbladt/Schupp/Wagner (2002)).  
 
   13
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Table 1: Empirical Results       
  Probit Tobit 
   Foreigners Migrants Foreigners Migrants 
Age  0.030  0.048 0.459 0.398 
  (0.90) (1.83)*  (2.71)***  (3.49)*** 
Age Squared  -0.000  -0.001 -0.005 -0.004 
  (1.18) (2.06)**  (2.83)***  (3.16)*** 
Gender (female=1)  -0.138 -0.111 -1,876 -1,166 
  (1.14) (1.12)  (3.16)***  (2.69)*** 
Martial Status (married =1) 
0.522 0.659 0.604  1,366 
  (2.96)*** (4.57)***  (0.73)  (2.25)** 
Education in years  0.028  0.044 0.303 0.410 
  (1.20) (2.39)**  (2.66)***  (4.96)*** 
Employed  0.666 0.511 4,041 3,100 
  (4.96)*** (4.77)*** (5.65)*** (5.92)*** 
Net household equivalent income  
0.128 0.054 0.894 0.969 
  (1.05) (0.60) (1.41)  (2.22)** 
Household size in Germany 
-0.142 -0.152 -1,535 -1,322 
  (2.88)*** (3.76)*** (5.84)*** (6.87)*** 
Turkish  0.016 0.050 0.090 0.534 
  (0.10) (0.33) (0.12) (0.79) 
Ex-Yugoslavia  0.715 0.754 3,210 3,239 
  (4.49)*** (4.67)*** (4.13)*** (4.50)*** 
Italian  -1,057 -1,039 -5,301 -4,790 
  (4.33)*** (4.22)*** (4.93)*** (4.86)*** 
German with migration 
background 
  0.194   1,355 
   (1.28)   (2.01)** 
"(Spaet-)Aussiedler"    0.678  3,708 
   (4.29)***  (5.24)*** 
Age/Years in Germany  0.034 0.041 0.097  0.178 
  (1.94)*  (2.51)** (0.92) (2.07)** 
Remigration plans (yes=1) 
0.217 0.266 0.810  1,049 
  (2.05)** (2.72)***  (1.43)  (2.19)** 
Visits to the country of origin 
(yes=1) 
0.358 0.340 2,150 1,347 
  (1.93)* (2.86)***  (2.11)** (2.29)** 
Concerns about xenophobia 
0.254 0.235 2,002 1,780 
  (2.12)** (2.35)**  (2.94)***  (3.48)*** 
Constant  -4,474 -4,673  -29,504  -31,222 
   (3.92)*** (5.34)*** (4.97)*** (7.57)*** 
Observations  2879 4151 2851 4115 
Log Likelihood  -877.32  -1369.02 -2375.79 -3817.37 
*10% level, **5% level, ***1% level.  Source: SOEP 2001-2006. Own calculations. 
 